Diversity and Migration: Setting the Stage
Why do some parts of the world have much greater ethnic and cultural diversity than others?
Let me begin by stating the obvious: ethnic diversity can only come about for one reason -long distance migration. Ceteris paribus, regions which have undergone greater immigration in the past will exhibit greater ethnic diversity in the present. The ceteris paribus qualification is essential since most observers only pay attention to immigration rates and foreign-born shares. Who the immigrants are and their 'ethnic distance' from the native-born matters just as much as the overall immigration rate; both dictate the size of the economic, cultural and linguistic diversity in the host country. 1 The interesting issue, then, is how the combination of immigrant ethnic diversity and the immigration rate work to forge the migration-diversity connection in the host country and whether there is an economic explanation for both.
It seems to me that if we understand what determines who and how many migrate,
then we understand what determines ethnic diversity. The most parsimonious explanation of migration, and thus of diversity, appeals simply to wage gaps between sending and receiving regions (Lucas 1988: 6) . I call this demand side thinking. It tells us unambiguously that labor surplus regions --which have, historically, always sent emigrants abroad --will also be regions at the bottom of the real wage, living standard and GDP per capita pecking order. These poor parts of the world will also tend to be the least diverse since they do not pull in migrants. Symmetrically, it also tells us that labor 1 There is a very large literature that tries to measure within country ethnic diversity, or what I call here 'ethnic distance', and a recent survey of it can be found in Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) .
scarce regions --which have, historically, always received immigrants from abroad --will be regions at the top of the real wage, living standard and GDP per capita pecking order. 2 They will also tend to be the most ethnically diverse.
The foreign-born share in the advanced economies today is 8.7 percent and the share for the developing countries is 1.5 percent (Freeman 2006: 146) , roughly confirming the prediction of the parsimonious model. Table 1 offers far more detail. The world population-weighted foreign-born ratio reported there is 2.98, but the range across major regions is huge: the two highest are Western Europe and North America (10.07, 3.4 times the world average) and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (8.24, 2.8 times the world average); the three lowest are East Asia (1.05), Latin America and the Caribbean (1.01), and South Asia (0.92). The high FB ratio for Eastern Europe and Central Asia may appear to be a surprise, but the explanation is simply that what had been internal migration in the USSR became external migration after the break up. The second surprise may appear to be sub-Saharan Africa, where the FB ratio is 3.66, but there has long been cross-border churning in that region (Hatton and Williamson 2002) . Finally, while foreign-born shares of 10 percent may not sound like high levels of cultural and ethnic diversity, remember that the foreign-born concentrate in gateway cities. Thus, while the foreign-born share is 'only' 4.3 in the United Kingdom, it is 28 in London, a ratio of almost seven to one! Similarly, the share for Paris (23) is almost two and a half times that of France (10). Big multiples also apply to modern high-wage gateway cities in the US The parsimonious demand-side model may work well in accounting for world variance in foreign-born shares, but it fails to take account of a force which has a powerful influence on ethnic diversity among the foreign-born. The migration of the poor has always been constrained on the supply side by poverty (Faini and Venturini 1994; Williamson 1998, 2005) , the cost of long distance moves, and the population share in the mobile age group. might produce a perfect correlation between living standards, immigration and ethnic diversity, with the causal direction going from living standards to migration to diversity.
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In fact, ever since 'free' mass migration started two centuries ago it has always been true that the richer of the poor regions, and the richer within poor regions, are the first to make the long distance move to the richest regions. Thus, while the United States had a lot of foreign-born in 1820 -before the big secular migration boom that started in the 1840s, most were ethnically, culturally and linguistically almost identical to the native-born. 
The Emigration Life Cycle
About 60 million Europeans set sail for the labor scarce New World in the century following 1820. Most moved to escape European poverty. European famine, revolution and ethnic cleansing certainly helped push the first great mass migrations, but it was 5 Most of the economics literature has looked instead at the impact of ethnic diversity on public goods and economic growth (e.g. Easterly and Levine 1997; Alesina et al. 1999; Alesina et al. 2003) . This seems unwise given that ethnic diversity is determined endogenously by migration. (where, in this example, they actually would have become immigration rates, at B'). In later stages of development, EM is more stable so that further improvements in real wages at home, to w 2 , cut back emigration rates to e 2 (at C). Thus, the emigration lifecycle in Figure 2 is reproduced in Figure 3 : starting at low wages and no emigration at A, emigration booms in the poor but developing country to B, then falls to C, and finally becomes a high-wage immigrating country at D.
What, then, might account for the rightward shifts in EM during early industrialization and its stability (or even leftward shift) thereafter? The first explanation appeals to the cost of migration and imperfect capital markets. Although there may be a strong incentive to flee pre-industrial poverty and rural subsistence, the costs of a long distance move are prohibitive for most poor laborers. Thus, enormous and historically persistent wage gaps between industrializing, resource-rich, high-wage countries and agrarian, resource-poor, low-wage countries are quite consistent with low emigration rates. As industrialization takes place in the poor sending countries, real wages rise and the supply constraints on emigration are gradually released: more and more potential emigrants can finance the move, and, in contrast with conventional theory, the home wage and emigration are positively correlated. As industrialization continues, the backlog of potential emigrants is slowly exhausted as more and more workers find ways to finance the move. 7 The demographic transition adds to that rightward shift in EM: the fall in infant mortality rates tends, after a 15 or 20 year lag, to create a fatter cohort of mobile young adults, thus contributing even more to the emigration boom. In addition, In summary, emigration histories typically pass through two regimes, the first emigrant supply constrained, and the second emigrant demand constrained. The emigrant-supply-constrained EM regime was consistent with the rising emigration and rising home wages since powerful rightward shifts in EM dominated. But at some point, home wages were high enough so that financial constraints were less binding: further increases in the home wage (relative to the foreign wage) then served to reduce the emigration incentive, the emigration rate fell as the economy moved up a more stable EM function, and emigration experience entered the demand-constrained regime. Emigration rates then fell as now-more-economically-mature sending regions began to catch up with the richer receiving regions.
Migration and Ethnic Diversity: The First US Global Century
The emigrant life cycle is consistent with conventional qualitative histories of the first global century. It implied an evolving change in immigrant source, quality and ethnic distance (from the native-born norm) through time. As the transport revolution unfolded between 1820 and 1913, the cost of long distance moves declined dramatically in terms of railroad fare to port, steerage rates between ports, and foregone income in transit. More potential migrants from more distant eastern and southern Europe could now make the move. Furthermore, as industrial revolutions started among the late-comers in eastern and southern Europe, the ratio of migration cost to annual income fell even more dramatically in those poor parts of Europe. The spread of the transport and the industrial revolutions both served to extend the reach of global migration: more potential emigrants in the poor rural hinterland of western Europe could make the move, and more potential emigrants from distant and backward eastern and southern Europe could make the move. Thus, migrant origins shifted to more backward and poorer regions, countries that were late-comers to modern economic growth. In addition, as each of these countries went through its own emigration life cycle, the share coming from poorer and ethnically different countries soared: those coming from the richer parts of Europe, with ethnic attributes similar to the native-born, declined in numbers as their emigration life cycle was completed; those coming from the poorer parts of Europe, with ethnic attributes different than the native-born, rose in numbers as their emigration life cycle began. Thus, the ethnic gap between the native-born and the new immigrant widened in host countries and they became culturally and ethnically more diverse.
This dramatic shift in immigrant source obeyed economic and demographic laws of motion. As I have already noted, the shift in immigrant source induced a rise in host country ethnic diversity. It also induced a decline in the quality of immigrants (as judged by labor markets) and an even bigger decline in the quality of immigrants relative to the native-born (who were increasing their human capital at a fast pace). The fall in immigrant quality and the rise in their ethnic 'distance' from the host country norm both had a great deal to do with rising negative attitudes towards immigration in the US, In short, the first global migration century came to an end, and the rising trend in host country ethnic diversity ceased. Or so says the conventional historical wisdom. Can it be confirmed with quantitative evidence? The US census reports country of birth starting with 1850, so I shall use these data to explore the hypothesis. True, country of birth isn't exactly ethnic diversity (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005) , but it's a start. I will also use the RQ index that is so common in the literature that explores the impact of ethnic diversity on economic growth and public goods expenditure (Esteban and Ray 1994; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2002; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005) :
where s i is the share of the foreign-born from origin-country i in total foreign-born population or in total population. The growth-public goods literature calls this a polarization index -reflecting its negative impact, but I will adopt the more benign view of migration and call it a diversity index. In any case, RQ reaches a maximum when two groups are of equal size and declines as their relative importance deviates: a high RQ indicates ethnic diversity. Of course, one would like to weight by the 'ethnic distance' between groups (e.g. by language and religion), but no such empirical analysis has yet been attempted (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005: 794) , and the US authorities did not offer such judgments (although US native-born citizens certainly did). I will come back to the issue of 'ethnic distance' since it will shade our interpretation of RQ levels and trends. Table 2 also reports RQ within the foreign-born group (diversity among the foreign-born), between the foreign-born and native-born (diversity between the two groups), and total diversity. Note the following in Table 2 : Total ethnic diversity reached a peak in 1860 (0.512), which it has not regained since, this despite the fact that diversity among the foreign-born was almost at its lowest (0.099). The explanation is that the RQ between index (the FB share) was at its peak (0.516).
Now consider the details, starting with the age of free migration 1850-1910. As predicted by the emigration life cycle model, within and total RQ changed far more dramatically than did the between RQ index (driven by the FB share). In the half-century before 1910, the within RQ rose five times faster than did the between RQ. The United that the US has reclaimed the title "a nation of immigrants" after a half-century retreat.
Has it also reclaimed the title "an ethnically diverse nation" after a half-century of retreat?
As this audience well knows, what happened to the United States after World War II also happened world-wide (Table 3 ). The foreign-born share increased by about a third in Oceania between 1965 and 2000 -from 14.4 to 19.1 percent, more than doubled in North America -from 6 to 13 percent, and more than tripled in Europe -from 2.2 to 7.7 percent. Of course, the addition of undocumented immigrants would raise these foreignborn shares, and perhaps even raise their increase over time. Illegal immigrants will also raise the ethnic diversity measures, since they tend to be unskilled from the poorest countries, individuals which host country immigration policy tries to keep out. Thus, restrictive immigration policy tends to make the social problems associated with ethnic diversity even worse: the larger the share illegal, the bigger the ethnic distance between and host country native-born norms.
While world migration has surged, the labor market quality of these immigrants The third shift involved the transformation of Latin America from a major emigrant destination to a major immigrant source. The emigrant life cycle leads us to expect that poor, low-wage and agrarian countries should send out more emigrants as they industrialize, but at some point they should start to retain their own and receive immigrants as they get fully industrial and high-wage. Latin America is an exception to the rule: it went from hosting (net) 1.8 million foreign-born in 1960, to having (net) 1.8 million of their own hosted abroad in 1980. The explanation for this unique regime switch appears to be that Latin America has a much richer and faster growing northern neighbor close by.
The fourth shift during the post-war decades involved Asian, African and Middle Eastern immigrants, whose numbers rose from a negligible to a huge flow. This evolution repeats the emigration life cycle experience of the first global century. Early industrializations and demographic transitions unleash a surge of emigration as the migration poverty trap is unlocked. Thus, the East Asian miracle first fostered an emigration surge, the rate of rise then slowed down, peaked, and subsequently declined as modern development ensued. The Middle East pattern has been delayed, as has been its development. The African pattern has been delayed even longer, as its growth over the past half century has been so disappointing.
Before moving on to the evolution of the RQ index since 1965, I want to stress the role of host country immigration policy. To repeat, in the first global century shifts in the source country composition were the result of the spread of the industrial revolution, rising incomes and demographic transitions in the poorer and more distant parts of Europe. That is, demographic booms and early industrial revolutions generated a surge in emigration from ethnically different countries, while demographic busts and mature industrial revolutions generated a fall in emigration from ethnically similar countries.
Falling transport costs between sending and receiving regions amplified these forces, as did the friends and relatives effect. These forces also slowly reduced positive selection:
the really poor could finance the move only late in the first global century, as their incomes at home rose and as the cost of passage fell. Exactly the same forces have also been at work in the modern era although policy has served to strengthen them. In the US, these included the abolition in 1965 of the country-of-origin quotas (and Asian bans) that had previously favored Europe, the shift to a worldwide quota, and the emphasis on family reunification as a key criteria for admission. Other OECD countries also leveled the source-country playing field, but the effects on immigrant composition (and ethnic diversity) were not quite as dramatic.
Now consider US experience with ethnic diversity since 1970 as reported in Table   5 . Note two important facts. In spite of all the debate about US immigration, the total ethnic diversity index in 2004 had only recovered its 1940 level, and it is unlikely that future levels will recover the peaks attained in the first third of the 20 th century (see Table   2 ). The big surprise is that all of the rise in total US ethnic diversity since 1970 has been due to rising immigration rates and FB shares. None of the rise has been due to greater ethnic diversity among the foreign-born since the within RQ has not risen over the past 35 years. The surge in immigrants from East Asia and Latin America, then eastern
Europe and the Middle East, then South Asia, and finally Africa has not left its mark on aggregate foreign-born diversity since each of those new sources simply replaced old sources.
While very few EU countries supply long time series on country-of-birth, three
Scandinavian countries do and they are presented in Table 6 . They confirm the US trends.
Namely, total migrant diversity has risen since 1970 in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, but the rise has been driven entirely by increasing FB shares. As with the US, diversity among the foreign-born themselves has actually fallen over time.
Which Countries Are the Most Diverse?
Most countries do not report country of birth data, but it is available for eleven industrial countries in 2001 plus France for 1990. Table 7 summarizes the data for all three RQ measures.
The total migrant ethnic diversity measure is highest by far for Australia (0.598) and Canada (0.518), well above the unweighted average of the twelve (0.319). Both
Australia and Canada recorded a total RQ index above that which the United States recorded in 1910 at the height of the free mass migration period (Table 2: (Table 7 : 0.508).
Two Concluding Words about the Research Agenda
My motivation in this paper is to offer measures of migrant diversity that are comparable across countries and over time, so that they can be used to assess its impact of public attitudes towards immigrants. To that extent, this paper offers only the first step.
It seems to me that there are two more steps to be taken before the political economy analysis can begin in earnest. First, our migrant diversity measure must be made richer by assigning the language, religion and other cultural attributes of source countries to foreign-born by country of birth. By so doing, it will attach weights to migrants by source given the cultural 'distance' they are from the native-born. 
